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The Writing on the Wall: The Potential Liability of
Mediators as Fiduciaries
I. INTRODUCTION
The number of potential fiduciary relationships is continuously
evolving to adjust to changing economic and social conditions.1 As
one scholar noted, “The twentieth century is witnessing an
unprecedented expansion and development of the fiduciary law.”2
Historically, courts have intentionally refrained from specifically
defining the scope of fiduciary duties in an effort to keep the
definition of a fiduciary open to new possibilities and situations.
Indeed, in 1924 the Oklahoma Supreme Court observed, “Courts of
equity have carefully refrained from defining the particular instances
of fiduciary relations in such a manner that other and perhaps new
cases might be excluded.”3 As the Oklahoma Supreme Court further
explained, “The expression ‘fiduciary relation’ is one of broad
meaning, including both technical fiduciary relations and those
informal relations which exist when one man trusts and relies upon
another.”4 Over the past few decades in particular, courts have
increasingly extended the designation of “informal fiduciary” under
certain factual circumstances to individuals—including some clergy,5
educators,6 travel agents,7 and even parents8—who have not

1. See GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 7, at 29 (2d
ed. 1984) (“Since 1800 there has been a great expansion and development in the law of trusts
in order to adapt it to changing economic and social conditions.”).
2. Tamara Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 796 (1983).
3. Reeves v. Crum, 225 P. 177, 179 (Okla. 1924) (citation omitted); see also Konover
Dev. Corp. v. Zeller, 635 A.2d 798, 806 (Conn. 1994) (“The Connecticut Supreme Court
has purposefully refrained from defining ‘a fiduciary relationship in precise detail and in such a
manner as to exclude new situations.’” (quoting Harper v. Ademetz, 113 A.2d 136, 139
(Conn. 1955))).
4. Reeves, 225 P. at 179.
5. Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 284 (Colo. 1988); Erickson v. Christenson,
781 P.2d 383, 386 (Or. 1989).
6. Chou v. Univ. of Chi., 254 F.3d 1347, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Johnson v. Schmitz,
119 F. Supp. 2d 90, 98 (D. Conn. 2000).
7. Maurer v. Cerkvenik-Anderson Travel, Inc., 890 P.2d 69, 71 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994);
Rodriguez v. Cardona Travel Bureau, 523 A.2d 281, 284 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1986).
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traditionally been considered inherent fiduciaries. Although courts,
and most scholars, have not yet recognized fiduciary liability for
mediators, this paper suggests that certain legal mediation
relationships are a likely future addition to this list. This paper
further argues that, applied correctly, the law of fiduciary duties can
provide an appropriate, effective, and predictable means of defining
and regulating obligations owed by mediators to their clients in
certain mediation relationships.
Part II provides background information on the law of fiduciary
duties, particularly the characteristics of both formal and informal
fiduciary relationships, and on the characteristics and regulation of
the growing mediation profession. Part III details the current trends
that will likely lead to a future increase in claims against mediators
based on breaches of fiduciary duties. Part IV discusses the
consequent likelihood that courts will eventually hold some
mediators liable for fiduciary duties. This section includes the
academic debate throughout the past two decades and discusses why
most scholars and mediators, along with the courts, have dismissed
the idea that mediators owe clients fiduciary duties and thus can be
held liable for breaches of those duties.
Part V discusses the unpredictability of the traditional approach
to determining fiduciary liability and describes a new fact-based
analytical framework, developed by Professors Brett G. Scharffs and
John W. Welch,9 to both identify the factors which likely heighten a
mediator’s duty and to provide a guide for mediators on how to
prevent the attachment of fiduciary duties. This section provides a
discussion of recent cases in which courts have declined to hold a
mediator to the enhanced duties of a fiduciary. When analyzed under
the Scharffs-Welch framework, the language of these rulings
indicates the strong possibility of holding mediators liable as
fiduciaries under specific factual circumstances when the magnitude
of the breach is particularly extreme. Part VI confronts and attempts
to overcome, through the use of the Scharffs-Welch framework,
several of the concerns voiced by opponents of extending fiduciary
duties to mediators. Part VII provides a brief conclusion.

8. Hieble v. Heible, 316 A.2d 777, 780 (Conn. 1972); Swift v. Ball, No.
CV010344047S, 2005 WL 648145, at *8 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 22, 2005).
9. Brett G. Scharffs & John W. Welch, An Analytic Framework for Understanding and
Evaluating the Fiduciary Duties of Educators, 2005 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 159.
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It should be emphasized at the outset that the purpose of this
paper is not to encourage litigation against a group of professionals
who offer society an important alternative to litigation.10 Rather, this
paper attempts to consider the potential fiduciary liability of
mediators in order to improve the quality of mediation service.
Analyzing the nature of mediation relationships under an analytic
framework of fiduciary duty can help practitioners not only identify
the existence or lack of fiduciary relationships more effectively but
also assess individual circumstances to prevent, or at least predict, the
attachment of fiduciary liability. This paper demonstrates that in at
least some mediation proceedings a strong argument can be made
that mediators owe some degree of fiduciary obligations to the
parties—primarily confidentiality, disclosure of conflicts of interest,
and good faith. While all mediation relationships will probably not
rise to this higher level of duty, the analytical factors discussed
provide a guide for determining the likelihood, in particular factual
circumstances, that a court might find a mediator liable for fiduciary
obligations in the future.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Fiduciary Duty
The law of fiduciaries provides an equitable doctrine exception to
the normal expectations of conduct in a laissez-faire society by legally
punishing the pursuit of one’s self interest at the expense of another
in certain relationships where protecting a high level of trust is
essential. Courts have found that while a fiduciary relationship “may
exist under a variety of circumstances; it exists in all cases where there
has been a special confidence reposed in one who in equity and good
conscience is bound to act in good faith and with due regard to the
interests of the one reposing confidence.”11 Thus, while no
definition has been derived that is flexible enough to specifically
cover all fiduciary situations,12 a fiduciary relationship typically exists

10. See Arthur A. Chaykin, Mediator Liability: A New Role for Fiduciary Duties?, 53 U.
CIN. L. REV. 731, 733 (1984).
11. Stone v. McClam, 257 S.E.2d 78, 83 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979), quoted in HAJMM Co.
v. House of Raeford Farms, Inc., 403 S.E.2d 483, 489 (N.C. 1991).
12. See Gregory B. Westfall, “But I Know It When I See It”: A Practical Framework for
Analysis and Argument of Informal Fiduciary Relationships, 23 TEX. TECH L. REV. 835, 836
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when there is a special relationship of confidence and trust imposed
and a position of superiority or influence results by virtue of this
special trust.13
Once a court establishes that a fiduciary relationship exists
between two or more parties, the fiduciary (the party in a position of
influence) is liable to the beneficiaries (the parties who trust and rely
on the fidelity of the fiduciary) for certain duties. The complexity of
fiduciary law lies in the vast number of statutes and court opinions,
arising in almost all areas of law, that deal with defining and applying
these fiduciary duties. Justice Cardozo, while sitting for the New
York Court of Appeals in Meinhard v. Salmon, provided the most
famous explanation of the high standard of duty that should apply to
fiduciaries:
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those
acting at arm’s length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary
ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the
market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the
most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to this there has
developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate.14

The Supreme Court acknowledged the lack of any comprehensive list
of fiduciary duties when it explained, “rather than explicitly
enumerating all of the powers and duties of trustees and other
fiduciaries, Congress invoked the common law of trusts to define the
general scope of their authority and responsibility.”15 Such duties
could include the duty to not commit fraud, gross negligence, or
intentional wrongdoing; to act with care and prudence; to obey
pertinent instructions; to be loyal, diligent, and exercise good faith;
to voluntarily disclose material information; to avoid self-dealing or
self-interested conduct; and to take the initiative in behalf of

(1992) (stating that finding an exact definition of “fiduciary” reminds one of Justice Stewart’s
predicament in deriving a workable definition for “pornography,” when he stated, “I know it
when I see it . . . .” (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
concurring))).
13. See, e.g., Anchor v. O’Toole, 94 F.3d 1014, 1023 (6th Cir. 1996) (“[A] fiduciary
relation is one in which a ‘special confidence and trust is reposed in the integrity and fidelity of
another and there is a resulting position of superiority or influence, acquired by virtue of this
special trust.’” (quoting Craggett v. Adell Ins. Agency, 635 N.E.2d 1326, 1331 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1993))).
14. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
15. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 224 (2000).
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beneficiaries.16 Once a court establishes the existence of a fiduciary
relationship, any or all of these duties may be applied depending on
the factual circumstances and the degree of formality of the
relationship under which the fiduciary duties occur.
Courts have identified two basic types of fiduciary relationships:
formal and informal.17 As one commentator explained, “Formal
fiduciary relationships arise as a matter of law based on the status of
the parties. Conversely, informal confidential relationships, and the
accompanying fiduciary obligations, are determined from the unique
facts pertaining to the parties’ particular relationship.”18 Some legal
relationships are so typically imbued with inherent qualities of trust,
confidence, and good faith that courts have been able to comfortably
assume that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, a formal
fiduciary relationship must exist. For example, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals has noted that “certain formal fiduciary
relationships, such as principal/agent, attorney/client, partnership
and trustee-cestui que trust, give rise to fiduciary duties as a matter
of law.”19 Based on the inherent trust and reliance associated with
their positions, the list of commonly accepted formal fiduciaries
includes corporate officers, agents, partners, lawyers, guardians,
employers, and trustees.20 Much of the well-established law of
fiduciaries deals with these formal relationships, and fiduciaries in
these relationships are generally held to the highest levels of fiduciary
duties.
Courts have additionally found that informal confidential
relationships may also give rise to some fiduciary duties in certain
factual circumstances when a special relationship of trust is

16. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 658 (8th ed. 2004); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 170 (1992).
17. See, e.g., Lee v. LPP Mortg. Ltd., 74 P.3d 152, 160 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting
Associated Indem. Corp. v. CAT Contracting, Inc., 964 S.W.2d 276, 287 (Tex. 1998)).
18. Roy Ryden Anderson, The Wolf at the Campfire: Understanding Confidential
Relationships, 53 SMU L. REV. 315, 325 (2000).
19. Imperial Premium Fin., Inc. v. Khoury, 129 F.3d 347, 353 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing
ARA Auto. Group v. Cent. Garage, Inc., 124 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir. 1997)).
20. See, e.g., City of Aurora v. Colo. State Eng’r, 105 P.3d 595, 622 (Colo. 2005)
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1(1) (1957) (defining agency as a fiduciary
relation)); Willis v. Maverick, 760 S.W.2d 642, 645 (Tex. 1988) (“A fiduciary relationship
exists between attorney and client.”).
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established.21 This second type of fiduciary relationship is not based
on the trust and reliance inherent to the type of relationship itself
but is instead “implied in law due to the factual situation
surrounding the involved transaction, and the relationship of the
parties to each other and to the transaction.”22 Courts have explained
that a “fiduciary relationship need not be created by contract,” and
certain types of fiduciary duties can occasionally arise in select noncontractual relationships.23 Particularly in these informal
relationships, courts have found that the attachment of fiduciary
obligations is not driven by title or status alone, but rather by varying
factual circumstances determined through a fact-specific analysis. For
example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that “the
existence of a fiduciary relation is a question of fact which properly
should be resolved by looking to the particular facts and
circumstances of the relationship at issue.”24
Courts have found that such informal relationships may establish
certain fiduciary duties when the facts indicate a “confidential
relationship”25 in which “one person trusts in and relies upon
another, whether the relation is a moral, social, domestic or merely
personal one.”26 For example, fiduciary liability has been applied to
clergy members when the “plaintiff’s claim . . . is not premised on
the mere fact that [the defendant] is a pastor, but on the fact that,
because he was plaintiff’s pastor and counselor, a special relationship
of trust and confidence developed.”27 Similarly, certain university
21. See, e.g., Stone v. Davis, 419 N.E.2d 1094, 1098 (Ohio 1981) (“[A] fiduciary
relationship . . . may arise out of an informal relationship where both parties understand that a
special trust or confidence has been reposed.”).
22. Lee, 74 P.3d at 160.
23. Stone, 419 N.E.2d at 1098.
24. In re Daisy Sys. Corp., 97 F.3d 1171, 1178 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Crim Truck &
Tractor Co. v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 823 S.W.2d 591, 594 (Tex. 1992) (holding that
the existence of an informal fiduciary relationship is a question of fact unless the “issue is one
of no evidence”); Michael Moffitt, Suing Mediators, 83 B.U. L. REV. 147, 167 (2003) (stating
that the attachment of fiduciary obligations is driven by circumstances and thus “the inquiry
about the existence of fiduciary duties is fact specific”).
25. Lee, 74 P.3d at 160.
26. Crim Truck, 823 S.W.2d at 594 (quoting Fitz-Gerald v. Hull, 237 S.W.2d 256,
261 (Tex. 1951)).
27. Erickson v. Christenson, 781 P.2d 383, 386 (Or. 1989); see also Destefano v.
Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 284 (Colo. 1988) (finding that a priest who “holds himself out to
the community as a professional or trained marriage counselor” had a fiduciary duty to
counseled members); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical
Immunity, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1789; Brett G. Scharffs & Cheryl Preston, The Religious
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educators have been found liable for breaches of their fiduciary duty
of loyalty based not on their status as professors but rather on their
blatant pursuit of self-interest at the great expense of trusting
students.28 Courts have also extended fiduciary duties of care to
travel agents for failing to disclose known dangers of travel.29 Courts
have even acknowledged that while “the bond between parent and
child is not per se a fiduciary one; it does generate, however, a natural
inclination to repose great confidence and trust.”30 Thus, while the
category of formal fiduciaries seems to be fairly established and
limited, the emergence of informal fiduciary relationships is more
fluid and open to new factual circumstances that satisfy the need to
protect trusting parties from certain breaches of that trust.
This flexibility allows for the possibility of expanding the
definition of fiduciary relationships to include circumstances such as
mediation, and it ensures that the designation of fiduciary duties is
not limited to only formal fiduciary relationships. Such fluidity can
also lead to uncertainty about when and to what degree fiduciary
duties apply in informal relationships of trust, and thus, under the
traditional doctrinal approach to fiduciary analysis, potential informal
fiduciaries cannot adequately predict if they must act with a higher
duty than normally required for their type of relationship status. A
more structured analytical framework, such as that described in Part
V, is thus needed to ensure a greater degree of predictability in
determining both the existence of an informal fiduciary relationship
and the extent to which fiduciary duties apply in that relationship.

Judgment Rule and the Fiduciary Duties of Clergy (Feb. 2005) (unpublished article, on file
with author).
28. See Chou v. Univ. of Chi., 254 F.3d 1347, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Johnson v.
Schmitz, 119 F. Supp. 2d 90, 98 (D. Conn. 2000); see also Scharffs & Welch, supra note 9, at
160; Ronna Greff Schneider, Sexual Harassment and Higher Education, 65 TEX. L. REV. 525,
552 (1987) (describing faculty-student relationships as fiduciary relationships).
29. See Maurer v. Cerkvenik-Anderson Travel, Inc., 890 P.2d 69, 71 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1994) (holding the travel agent potentially violated fiduciary duty of care by failing to warn
customer of the train’s known history of drunken college student fatalities); Rodriguez v.
Cardona Travel Bureau, 523 A.2d 281, 284 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1986) (finding that
travel agent violated fiduciary duty in failing to explain risks of travel with charter carrier that
later went bankrupt).
30. Hieble v. Heible, 316 A.2d 777, 780 (Conn. 1972); see also Swift v. Ball, No.
CV010344047S, 2005 WL 648145, at *8 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 22, 2005) (“[R]elationships
that generate a natural inclination to trust, such as brother-brother or parent-child . . . also
supply a strong indicium of a fiduciary relationship.” (quoting Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman
Catholic Diocesan, 10 F. Supp. 2d 138, 154 (D. Conn. 1998))).
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B. Mediation
In essence, mediation is a voluntary legal process engaged in by
disputing parties who choose to decide the resolution of their
dispute themselves, under the direction of an impartial third party
mediator, rather than submitting to the imposition of a judicial
ruling through traditional litigation. The mediator facilitates
negotiation “to assist disputing parties in voluntarily reaching their
own mutually acceptable” compromises tailored to the needs and
interests of both parties without the relatively higher costs associated
with a more formal legal proceeding or even an arbitration.31 The
Model Standards of Conduct recently adopted by the American Bar
Association, American Arbitration Association, and the Association
for Conflict Resolution set forth the following five specific objectives
of mediation: “Providing the opportunity for parties to define and
clarify issues, understand different perspectives, identify interests,
explore and assess possible solutions, and reach mutually satisfactory
agreements, when desired.”32
In an age of increasing legal conflicts, the benefits of mediation
have drawn many who want to avoid the complexity and adversarial
nature of litigation to resolve their disputes through alternative
methods such as mediation. Mediation offers expedited resolutions,
cost savings, confidentiality, privacy, self-determination of the
resolution by the parties, the opportunity for preserving relationships
between parties, informality, flexibility, and mutually agreeable
resolutions. The informality of the mediation process also allows
almost anyone to serve in the role of mediator as long as the
mediator fulfills any relevant state requirements for mediation
certification or training. All states acknowledge that both lawyers and
non-lawyers can serve as professional mediators, although wide
national disparity persists concerning the proper standards and
requirements for mediator certification.33 Additionally, at least one
study has provided statistically significant data that alternative dispute
31. Ronald J. Hedges, Mediation Developments & Trends, SK042 A.L.I.–A.B.A. 1485,
1487 (2005) (quoting Saeta v. Superior Ct., 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 610, 616 (Ct. App. 2004)).
32. AM. BAR ASS’N ET AL., MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS 2
(2005), http://www.abanet.org/dispute/news/ModelStandardsofConductforMediatorsfinal
05.pdf.
33. See Richard Birke & Louise Ellen Teitz, U.S. Mediation in 2001: The Path That
Brought America to Uniform Laws and Mediation in Cyberspace, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 181,
191–92 (2002).
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resolution programs increase the likelihood of a monetary
settlement.34 Other sources indicate that participation in the
mediation process generally contributes to greater satisfaction for
both parties involved.35 For these reasons, the presence of the
mediation profession has grown substantially in the last few
decades.36
Throughout its short history, the use of mediation as a method
of alternative dispute resolution has developed without the guidance
of a consistent or comprehensive regulatory system. Starting in the
1960s, mediation emerged as a viable alternative to litigation in nonmainstream areas of law such as labor management, and
neighborhood and domestic relations disputes.37 While mediation
remained circumscribed within these limited areas, the need for
regulation never arose as a prominent issue.38 Throughout the 1970s
and 1980s, mediation expanded into an industry impacting nearly all
aspects of law. At the illustrious Pound Conference in 1976,
Professor Frank Sander described his vision of a future “multi-door
courthouse” that would divert a substantial amount of cases to nonlitigation processes.39 By prominently including the use of mediation
in his model, Sander’s call for reform marks the critical moment
when the legal community first officially acknowledged the potential
of mediation to play an influential role in the future of dispute
resolution.40
Since that time, mediation has rapidly become more and more
institutionalized in society with the dramatic escalation of the use of
alternative dispute resolution in recent years. Indeed, over the past
few decades, the mediation profession has “grown in epic
34. See Hedges, supra note 31, at 1489.
35. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie & James Levin, A “Party Satisfaction” Perspective on a
Comprehensive Mediation Statute, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 885, 887 n.7 (1998).
36. See Charles Pou, Jr., Assuring Excellence, or Merely Reassuring? Policy and Practice
In Promoting Mediator Quality, 2004 J. DISP. RESOL. 303, 303 (“Mediation practice has
grown substantially over the last two decades . . . .”); Evan Spelfogel, New Trends in the
Arbitration of Employment Disputes, ARB. J., Mar. 1993, at 6.
37. See Birke & Teitz, supra note 33, at 182–83.
38. See id. at 186.
39. Frank E. A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, in THE POUND CONFERENCE:
PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 65 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds.,
1979).
40. See Paula M. Young, Rejoice! Rejoice! Rejoice, Give Thanks, and Sing: The ABA,
ACR, and AAA Adopt Revised Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, 5 APPALACHIAN
J.L. 195, 200 (2006).
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proportions.”41 The Prefatory Note to the proposed Uniform
Mediation Act explains that
[d]uring the last thirty years the use of mediation has expanded
beyond its century-long home in collective bargaining to become
an integral and growing part of the processes of dispute resolution
in the courts, public agencies, community dispute resolution
programs, and the commercial and business communities, as well as
among private parties engaged in conflict.42

One commentator observed this growth and warned, “The practice
of mediation, like computerized electronic transfers, is growing so
rapidly and in such unpredictable ways that it may be folly to
presently attempt to capture the future in binding legislation.”43 This
concern for preserving the flexibility of mediation has not hindered
the passage of numerous statutes relating to mediation, but may have
restrained many lawmakers from entering into a nationally
standardized approach to mediation and from engaging in a
significant degree of formal regulation of the profession.
The significant and recent growth in this area has left many
courts, lawmakers, and scholars unsure about how to approach
mediation from a legal perspective.44 A Harvard Law Review article
in 1986 observed, “The recent spread of informal methods of
dispute resolution into new areas has galvanized a debate regarding
the legal character of one of the most popular informal specialists,
the mediator.”45 This debate continues today. Mediation is still a
fairly unregulated service, and few formal quality control mechanisms
exist. Currently, the legal rules affecting mediation are complex,

41. Pamela A. Kentra, Hear No Evil, See No Evil, Speak No Evil: The Intolerable Conflict
for Attorney-Mediators Between the Duty To Maintain Mediation Confidentiality and the Duty
To Report Fellow Attorney Misconduct, 1997 BYU L. REV. 715, 719; see also Birke & Teitz,
supra note 33 at 182–83.
42. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM
MEDIATION ACT, Prefatory Note (2003), http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/mediat/
2003finaldraft.pdf.
43. Hedges, supra note 31, at 1500.
44. See ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF
MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION 15
(1994) (“While the growth of mediation in the past two decades is remarkable, what is even
more striking is the extraordinary divergence of opinion about how to understand that growth
and how to characterize the mediation movement itself.”).
45. Note, The Sultans of Swap: Defining the Duties and Liabilities of American
Mediators, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1876, 1876 (1986) [hereinafter Sultans of Swap].
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scattered, and inconsistent.46 The widespread success of mediation as
an alternative form of dispute resolution has now engendered more
than 2500 state and federal statutes attempting to institutionalize
mediation.47 These statutes establish mediation programs in a wide
variety of contexts and encourage or even mandate their use.48 Many
states have also created offices to encourage greater use of
mediation.49 However, such a plethora of regulations leads to
complexity in the law and a lack of uniformity, which result in
uncertainty over how and when to apply the statutes, especially in a
multi-state context.50 Furthermore, these numerous statutes contain
almost no standardization for such important issues as mediation
certification requirements, ethical standards, confidentiality
requirements, evidentiary privileges against disclosure in legal
proceedings, immunity from litigation for mediators, and quality
control.
Many scholars have expressed concern about the effect that
inconsistencies in confidentiality protections, the lingering
application to mediators of traditional immunity or quasi-immunity
from litigation, few statutory or regulatory restrictions, and a lack of
required credentialing have had, and will likely have in the future, on
the quality of mediation.51 Commentators have regarded openness
and confidentiality of disclosures as “pillars of mediation,” yet these
commentators have also observed that
the development of institutional protection for mediation
confidentiality has been anything but uniform. Some states offer a
mediation privilege that is held by the parties, and other
jurisdictions vest a separate right in the mediator. Some states have

46. See Hedges, supra note 31, at 1498.
47. See Uniform Law Commissioners, Why States Should Adopt the Uniform Mediation
Act (2001), http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_why/uniformacts-why-uma.asp (last
visited Oct. 3, 2006).
48. See SARAH R. COLE, CRAIG A. MCEWEN & NANCY H. ROGERS, MEDIATION: LAW,
POLICY, PRACTICE app. B (2d ed. 2001 & 2001 Supp.).
49. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-7-102 (1995); HAW. REV. STAT. § 613-2 (1989);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-501 (1996); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 7, § 51 (1998); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 25-2904 (1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27E-73 (West 1994); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 179.02 (West 1995); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1803.1 (1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 36.105
(1997); W. VA. CODE § 55-15-2 (1990).
50. See Uniform Law Commissioners, supra note 47.
51. See, e.g., Moffitt, supra note 24.
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clear rules about ‘mandatory reporting’ (of various offenses, like
child abuse) while others have more opaque rules or none at all.52

And some scholars call for full immunity for mediators based on their
quasi-judicial role,53 whereas others argue that “[m]ediator immunity
represents the inequitable shifting of risk of mediator misconduct
from the mediators and the courts to those mediation participants
least able to protect themselves from or shoulder the burden of such
negative
behavior.”54
These
inconsistencies
hinder
any
comprehensive regulation of mediation. Commentator Michael
Moffitt has consequently observed, “As the use of mediation
explodes in popularity, assuring the quality of mediation services has
become an increasingly visible challenge.”55 Moffitt explains that
“[m]ost occupations and professions have credentialing or other
barriers to entry into practice, statutory or regulatory restrictions on
practice methods, and oversight of some sort. . . . In contrast,
mediation operates with few, if any, formal structures for assuring
the quality of mediation services.”56
Recent efforts have been made to pass more standardized
regulations and ethical codes for mediation, including a proposed
Uniform Mediation Act (“UMA”) and Model Standards of Conduct
for Mediators.57 Referring to the multitude of inconsistent statutes
currently affecting mediation, one commentator remarked, “Many of
those statutes can be replaced by the [UMA], which applies a generic
approach to topics that are covered in varying ways by a number of
specific statutes currently scattered within substantive provisions.”58
The preface to the proposed UMA states, “In particular, the law
has the unique capacity to assure that the reasonable expectations of
participants regarding the confidentiality of the mediation process
52. Birke & Tietz, supra note 33, at 195–96; see also Owen V. Gray, Protecting the
Confidentiality of Communications in Mediation, 36 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 667 (1998).
53. Joseph B. Stulberg, Mediator Immunity, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 85, 85
(1986).
54. Scott H. Hughes, Mediator Immunity: The Misguided and Inequitable Shifting of
Risk, 83 OR. L. REV. 107, 111 (2004).
55. Moffitt, supra note 24, at 148.
56. Id.
57. The text of the UMA and the accompanying reporters’ notes are available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/mediat/2003finaldraft.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2006).
The 2005 Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators are available at
http://www.abanet.org/dispute/news/ModelStandardsofConductforMediatorsfinal05.pdf.
58. See Hedges, supra note 31, at 1498.
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are met, rather than frustrated. For this reason, a central thrust of the
Act is to provide a privilege that assures confidentiality in legal
proceedings.”59 The National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Law adopted the UMA in 2001, and the American
Bar Association approved it in 2002 primarily to provide uniform
mediation standards and procedures to protect the confidentiality of
mediations in subsequent litigation.60 The American Bar Association,
the American Arbitration Association, and the Association for
Conflict Resolution also recently adopted Model Standards of
Conduct for Mediators, which provide uniform ethical and conduct
standards to better protect the quality of mediation for clients.61
While the UMA and the Model Standards of Conduct have not yet
been adopted by many states and thus do not have the force of law,
they indicate a trend toward increased regulation of mediation to
address the need for quality control and accountability of mediators
for misconduct.
The probable future standardization of mediation rules and
conduct standards will likely increase the potential for litigation
based on mediator misconduct. The current lack of such standards,
and thus of any clearly discernable duty of care upon which a court
could base a ruling, has been cited as a leading obstacle to currently
holding mediators liable for misconduct.62 But as standards of
conduct for mediators become more institutionalized through the
passage of more standardized regulations, the duties for which courts
can hold mediators accountable for misconduct and ethical violations
will become more clear, and it will become easier to establish
liability.
The UMA acknowledges the potential for litigation against
mediators by permitting disclosure of a mediation communication
(as an exception to the mediation privilege of confidentiality
established in the UMA) if the communication is sought or offered
to prove or disprove a claim or complaint “of professional
misconduct or malpractice” against a mediator.63 The New Jersey
State Bar Association has acknowledged this proposed provision and

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

See UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT, supra note 42, at Prefatory Note.
See Uniform Law Commissioners, supra note 47.
See supra note 57.
Moffitt, supra note 24, at 168.
UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT, supra note 42, at § 6(5).
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noted that if the UMA is adopted by the states, “[I]t might be
possible to argue that the legislature has indirectly created a new
cause of action of professional misconduct or professional
malpractice for mediators, where one did not exist before.”64
Another commentator has also warned mediators that ethics
codes, even aspirational codes such as the 2005 Model Standards of
Conduct, “can establish a standard of care for mediators that tort
lawyers will reference when attempting to prove mediator
malpractice.”65 The note on construction for the Model Standards of
Conduct also explicitly acknowledges this risk, stating,
These standards, unless and until adopted by a court or other
regulatory authority do not have the force of law. Nonetheless, the
fact that these Standards have been adopted by the respective
sponsoring entities, should alert mediators to the fact that the
Standards might be viewed as establishing a standard of care for
mediators.66

As discussed below, this increased litigation against mediators
resulting from more standardized regulations could effectively
include the possibility of claims for fiduciary liability when a
mediator severely breaches his duties.
III. CURRENT TRENDS LEADING TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF FUTURE
MEDIATOR FIDUCIARY DUTY CLAIMS
As described above, recent decades have witnessed both the
expanding category of informal fiduciaries to whom fiduciary liability
may be applied in certain factual circumstances as well as the
increasing popularity of mediation as an alternative to litigation.67
Against the backdrop of today’s increasingly litigious society, these
concurrent trends lead to a resulting increase in the concern of
mediators about liability insurance to protect against litigation. The
trends also lead to the likelihood of an increase in fiduciary duty
claims against mediators in the future. This section explores the
intersection of these trends and concludes that not only will lawsuits
against mediators continue to generally increase, but also, more
64. New Jersey State Bar Association, Report Regarding the Uniform Mediation Act (on
file with author), quoted in Hedges, supra note 31, at 1563.
65. Young, supra note 40, at 208.
66. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION ET AL., supra note 32, at 3.
67. See supra Part II.B.
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specifically, mediators will increasingly face lawsuits based on claims
of breach of the mediators’ fiduciary duties. These trends in current
society thus provide the basis for the argument in Part IV that future
courts will likely expand the category of informal fiduciary to include
mediators who substantially violate their ethical duties. If courts
apply the analytical framework discussed in Part V, this eventual
application of fiduciary law to certain mediators could provide a
more effective, appropriate, and predictable means of defining and
regulating the obligations of mediation relationships.
American society has become increasingly litigious as more
people turn to attorneys and the courts to resolve disputes.
Consequently, tort reform has become a major national issue at the
forefront of public policy discussions.68 Many commentators have
expressed concern about this trend of seeking legal solutions to every
type of problem in every type of relationship.69 As one commentator
observed, “Litigation has become our national pastime.”70 In spite of
efforts to reform the legal process, litigation remains a significant
threat to those who provide a variety of services. Professionals such
as physicians, attorneys, and even teachers have been forced to take
steps to protect themselves against liability.71 Although litigation
against mediators remains as yet minimal compared to other
professions, as mediation continues to become more institutionalized
it is likely that the trend of litigiousness will increasingly affect

68. See, e.g., George W. Bush, Legal Reform: The High Costs of Lawsuit Abuse,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/medicalliability (last visited Mar. 21, 2006) (“The costs
of litigation per person in the United States are far higher than in any other major
industrialized nation in the world. Lawsuit costs have risen substantially over the past several
decades. . . . This explosion in litigation is creating a logjam in America’s civil courts and
threatening jobs across America.”).
69. See PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE COLLAPSE OF THE COMMON GOOD: HOW AMERICA’S
LAWSUIT CULTURE UNDERMINES OUR FREEDOM (2002); PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH
OF COMMON SENSE: HOW LAW IS SUFFOCATING AMERICA (1996); Mortimer B. Zuckerman,
Welcome To Sue City, U.S.A., U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 16, 2003, at 64.
70. Zuckerman, supra note 69, at 64.
71. See Mark Carpenter, Education Not Litigation: The Paul D. Coverdell Teacher
Liability Protection Act of 2001, CITIZENS FOR A SOUND ECON., Mar. 21, 2001, available at
http://www.cse.org/informed/pdf_files/cc293_Teacher_Protection_Act.pdf (“[T]eachers are
becoming more and more concerned each school year with the threat of lawsuits. In fact, a
survey by the American Federation of Teachers shows that liability protection ranks among the
top three concerns teachers want their unions to address.”); Jessica Portner, Fearful Teachers
Buy Insurance Against Liability, EDUC. WK., Mar. 29, 2000 (showing that the number of
teachers purchasing liability insurance increased 25 percent between 1995 and 2000).
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mediators.72 More specifically, as statutory restrictions and
regulations provide more formal parameters and more established
duties for mediators, mediator liability and exposure to litigation is
also likely to increase. The histories of both medical and attorney
malpractice suits indicate that as mediation becomes more
established professionally and economically, malpractice suits will
likely follow.73
Already, increasing litigation against service providers and
professionals and the growth of a largely unregulated mediation
profession, as described in Part II, have combined to produce a new
trend—a burgeoning sense of apprehension about liability and
potential litigation among mediators. At a 2004 symposium on
mediator accountability, Alvin L. Zimmerman, a former Texas
district court judge and current mediator, voiced his concerns about
the future of the mediation profession and the threat that
“malpractice will become a more oppressive industry” to mediators
as the mediation profession becomes more established in society.74
Zimmerman is not alone in these concerns. Michael Moffitt has also
observed, “Despite the historical rarity of suits against mediators,
many within the mediation community are demonstrating concern
about the prospect of mediators being sued. An increasing number
of jurisdictions and programs require mediators to carry liability

72. The trend of mediators’ relative freedom from lawsuits likely is not a result of
mediators not making mistakes, but rather the result of several contributing factors, including
the difficulty of succeeding on such claims, the immunity which sometimes extends to
mediators, and the disputant’s disposition toward settlement and other non-adjudicative
means, which would likely create a desire to resolve a dispute with the mediator without
resorting to litigation. See Moffitt, supra note 24, at 150–53.
73. David I. Bristow & Jesmond Parke, The Gathering Storm of Mediator & Arbitrator
Liability, 55 DISP. RESOL. J. 14, 16 ( 2000); see also Alvin L. Zimmerman et al., Mediator
Accountability: Ethical and Legal Standards of the Profession, 28 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 47, 61
(2004) (“I almost parallel where we are today to an infant or burgeoning profession, almost
like doctors in the early days. As long as doctors charged very little, made house calls, were
courteous, and listened to the complaint of their patients, there were not malpractice claims to
speak of. . . . I submit to you that, while we are infants, the public is putting up with us. As our
fees increase, however, and as our obnoxiousness and independence grow more important, I
believe that malpractice will become a more oppressive industry to those of us sitting in this
room.”).
74. See Zimmerman et al., supra note 73, at 61. The very nature of this symposium
indicates the increasing concern of mediators about the degree of their accountability and the
potential threat of future malpractice litigation.
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insurance.”75 Although mediators have traditionally been considered
fairly protected from lawsuits,76 and although few claims have been
filed against mediators and even fewer claims have succeeded,77
mediators increasingly buy liability insurance; many jurisdictions and
programs require mediators to carry such insurance.78 One scholar
and mediator observed that, in his own experience, “the percentage
of training time mediators spend asking about the prospect of
liability has increased over the past decade.”79 Adding to this
apprehension, a journal article in 2000 warned of a “gathering
storm” of liability on the horizon about to strike mediators: “As
lawyers, doctors, and indeed all professionals stood for so long
seemingly immune from blame and liability, before the harsh winds
of change struck them, so now our arbitrators and mediators carry
on from day to day while the barometer is falling.”80
No court has yet recognized mediation as a fiduciary
relationship, but the issue of mediator liability is increasingly being
discussed by the judiciary. While claims filed against mediators are
still fairly uncommon, they have increased in recent years.81 Courts

75. Michael Moffitt, Ten Ways To Get Sued: A Guide for Mediators, 8 HARV. NEGOT. L.
REV. 81, 83 (2003).
76. See, e.g., Moffitt, supra note 24, at 150–52 (“[I]t is extraordinarily difficult to sue a
mediator successfully.”); see also Zimmerman et al., supra note 73, at 59–61.
77. See Moffitt, supra note 24, at 150–51; see also L. Wayne Scott, The Law of Mediation
in Texas, 37 ST. MARY’S L.J. 325, 414–15 (2006) (“There are few reported Texas cases where
actions have been filed against mediators, and none where a mediator has been held liable for
any act or omission connected with the conduct of a mediation. It is unlikely that there will be
many such cases, because any plaintiff will have to show that an act or omission of the mediator
caused some legal injury.”).
78. See, e.g., Cuyahoga County, Ohio, Domestic Relations Rule 32(E)(4),
http://domestic.cuyahogacounty.us/Rules/Rule32.htm (requiring mediators to have liability
insurance) (last visited Oct. 3, 2006); Gotcha Covered: Your Professional Liability Insurance
Coverage, AAM NEWSL., Feb. 2001, http://www.attorney-mediators.org/news200102.html
(setting minimum liability insurance policy limits); West Virginia State Web Portal, Family
Court-Ordered Mediation in West Virginia, http://www.state.wv.us/wvsca/familyct/
cover.htm (requiring mediators to have liability insurance) (last visited Oct. 3, 2006).
79. Moffitt, supra note 75, at 83.
80. Bristow & Parke, supra note 73, at 16.
81. See James R. Coben & Peter N. Thompson, Disputing Irony: A Systematic Look at
Litigation About Mediation, 11 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 43, 47–49, 95, 98 (2006) (Analyzing
all 1223 state and federal court mediation decisions available on the Westlaw databases
“allstates” and “allfeds” for the years 1999 through 2003, and finding that in this five-year
span when general civil case loads were relatively steady or declining nationwide, mediation
litigation increased 95 percent, from 172 decisions in 1999 to 335 in 2003. Litigation
concerning mediator misconduct as a contract defense was much more infrequent—only
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largely dismiss these claims; there was only one reported case from all
federal and state courts that found a mediator liable to a party for
mediation misconduct, and in that case the defendant successfully
appealed the jury award.82 The defendant asserted that his actions did
not constitute negligence because, as a mediator rather than as an
attorney, he owed no duty to perform the tasks the plaintiff claimed
he had negligently failed to perform.83 The Court of Appeals
specifically declined to resolve the precise nature of the defendant’s
duties, resolving the matter on the issue of proximate causation
instead and reversing the judgment.84 One commentator has noted
that “[a]s a result, no cases exist in the official reporters in which a
mediator ultimately paid a former client for injuries the mediator
caused during mediation.”85
Although lawsuits against mediators are minimal and suits where
mediators lose are even more scarce, the number of lawsuits against
mediators are increasing.86 As such litigation against mediators
increases generally, fiduciary liability is one potential form that
lawsuits may take.87 Such actions are still a novel concept. The few
courts that have considered the idea of mediator liability, and
specifically fiduciary liability, have rejected the idea. Yet there are
indications that not only will such fiduciary claims eventually be
brought against mediators, but also courts will likely find fiduciary
duties to exist in certain situations. Indeed, although no court has
yet clearly found such an existence of a fiduciary mediation
relationship, the federal reporters record that in recent years at least
one breach of fiduciary duty claim has in fact been filed against a
seventeen cases in the five-year span—and the study revealed only four claims filed specifically
naming mediators as defendants for misconduct.); see also Zimmerman et al., supra note 73, at
57 (stating that only twenty-one claims have been made against mediators for misconduct and
that those have occurred mainly since 2001 (citing statistics provided by Complete Equity
Markets (on file with the authors of the article))).
82. See Lange v. Marshall, 622 S.W.2d 237, 238 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that the
party suing her attorney-mediator failed to establish that she suffered any damages proximately
caused by the attorney-mediator’s misconduct); see also Coben & Thompson, supra note 81, at
98 (citing a search of Westlaw and Lexis-Nexis databases on May 15, 2006 that yielded no
reported cases in which the mediator was held liable for misconduct in his role as a mediator).
83. Lange, 622 S.W.2d at 238.
84. Id. at 238–39.
85. Moffitt, supra note 24, at 150–51.
86. See Zimmerman et al., supra note 73, at 56–57.
87. See Lela P. Love & John W. Cooley, The Intersection of Evaluation by Mediators and
Informed Consent: Warning the Unwary, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 45, 63 (2005).
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mediator for misconduct.88 This claim indicates the potential for
dissatisfied mediation clients to bring breach of fiduciary duty actions
when seeking remedies for mediator misconduct. As discussed below
in Part V, while the factual circumstances of this and other relevant
cases did not rise to the level of breaches of duty serious enough to
warrant the extension of fiduciary liability, these cases leave open the
possibility that such liability may be found in certain other mediation
situations.
The expanding definition of informal fiduciaries, coupled with
fiduciary-like duties such as confidentiality and good faith already
inherent to mediation, make the mediation profession a viable
candidate for courts to apply fiduciary liability in certain
circumstances of extreme breaches of those duties. Although, as
discussed in Part IV below, historically most commentators have
argued that mediation and fiduciary law are incompatible,
commentators Lela P. Love and John W. Cooley have recently
explained:
Mediators may violate the duty of trustworthiness by deceiving
parties as to their credentials or by misinforming parties as to the
kind of service that will be provided. Consequently, the failure to
obtain the parties’ consent to the mediator’s provision of an
evaluation may give rise to a cause of action for breach of fiduciary
duty. Where a court finds the existence of a fiduciary relationship
between a mediator and a party, the fiduciary will be under a
special duty of full disclosure.89

Although there is currently a lack of lawsuits brought against
mediators under fiduciary law, the current trend appears to be
heading in that direction. This possibility leads to the issue of
whether, when confronting future lawsuits brought against
mediators under fiduciary law, courts will find the existence of a
fiduciary relationship and apply fiduciary liability.
IV. EXTENDING FIDUCIARY DUTIES TO MEDIATORS
Although the courts have thus far consistently refused to attach
fiduciary duties to mediators, for the past couple of decades scholars
have debated the extent of mediators’ duties to their clients,

88. Lehrer v. Zwernemann, 14 S.W.3d 775, 776 (Tex. App. 2000).
89. Love & Cooley, supra note 87, at 63.
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including the possibility of holding those who practice mediation
liable for breaches of fiduciary duties. As recently noted,
“[c]urrently, the question of the legal nature and scope of the
professional duties of mediators is an open one, as is the question of
what the remedies might be if a mediator violates such unspecified
duties.”90
In 1984, Professor Arthur Chaykin first hypothesized that
mediators could be, and in fact should be, considered to owe
fiduciary duties.91 He argued that the essence of fiduciary duties can
be discoverable in the principle of “justifiable trust.”92 He asserted
that the concept of justifiable trust is “readily adaptable to the
mediation context” because the “mediator actively seeks to gain the
trust of the [parties] in order to maximize effectiveness,” the “parties
rely on the mediator” to be honest and fair to both parties, and the
“mediator has superior skill, experience, and information,” giving
him a “powerful political position between the [two] parties.”93 He
further argued that “[t]rust is such an essential element of the
mediator’s work . . . that mediators generally should be held to the
virtually per se rule applied to trustees and attorneys.”94 Thus,
Chaykin’s arguments sought to attach the highest level of fiduciary
duties to most, if not all, mediators and to include mediators in the
category of the formal fiduciary.
Chaykin’s arguments to extend fiduciary liability to mediators
were immediately and justifiably met with criticism by mediators and
mediation scholars, including those who wanted to protect the
freedom from liability that mediators traditionally enjoyed. A
Harvard Law Review article in 1986 accurately criticized Chaykin’s
approach as an “overbroad formulation of mediators’ legal duties
and liabilities.”95 It argued that “[t]he main shortcoming of the
fiduciary model lies in its insistence on holding all mediators—
regardless of their compensation arrangements, institutional

90. Hedges, supra note 31, at 1563.
91. Chaykin, supra note 10, at 732.
92. Id. (“[T]he essential consideration in determining if a fiduciary duty exists is
whether, under the circumstances of the case, the injured party justifiably trusted the
defendant. If he did, the courts generally will find a fiduciary duty and subject the fiduciary to
high standards of fairness and significant procedural burdens.”). Id. at 744.
93. Id. at 744–45.
94. Id. at 745.
95. Sultans of Swap, supra note 45, at 1877.
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incentives, and professional expertise—liable in damages for defects
in the contractarian process.”96 By ignoring the great differences
among mediators who function in different institutional settings,
Chaykin’s argument “failed to account for the qualitative differences
between the contractarian processes that mediators facilitate.”97
Another article, written in the same year by Joseph Stulberg,
explicitly disagreed with Chaykin’s assumptions regarding the
mediator’s role.98 Stulberg instead advocated that legislation be
drafted holding a mediator “completely immune from legal liability
for all actions undertaken in his role as a mediator.”99 Yet in spite of
his direct and complete dismissal of Chaykin’s thesis that mediators
might be liable for fiduciary duties, Stulberg conceded that when a
mediator deliberately provides incorrect information in order to
improve one party’s position at the expense of the other, a
compelling argument might be made that such conduct violates a
mediator’s duty to the parties.100 As such, it is not a “mediating act”
warranting immunity.101 However, while Stulberg agreed with
Chaykin that liability might attach as an analytical matter in such
circumstances, he argued it would be too difficult to prove in
reality.102
Thus, while these articles, written soon after Chaykin’s article,
adamantly criticized his argument that mediators should be held to
formal fiduciary duties, they either directly or implicitly accepted at
least the premise that mediators might be held liable in some
circumstances for misconduct relating to duties typically owed by
fiduciaries. However, both of these authors ultimately dismissed
Chaykin’s general idea of holding mediators liable as fiduciaries. This
dismissal set the tone for subsequent decades of academic discussion
of mediator liability. Later commentators generally continued to
96. Id. at 1883.
97. Id. at 1877.
98. Stulberg, supra note 53, at 85 (“I disagree with Professor Chaykin’s assumptions
regarding the mediator’s role, and consequently, find his conclusions regarding mediator
liability unpersuasive.”).
99. Id. But see Hughes, supra note 54, at 111 (“Mediator immunity represents the
inequitable shifting of risk of mediator misconduct from the mediators and the courts to those
mediation participants least able to protect themselves from or shoulder the burden of such
negative behavior.”).
100. Stulberg, supra note 53, at 87.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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argue that mediation did not qualify as even an informal fiduciary
relationship.
Writing several years after Chaykin’s article, Michael Moffitt also
admited that “[a]s a theoretical matter, an injured mediation party
could assert that the mediator’s behavior constituted a breach of
fiduciary obligations.”103 Yet he argues that “[a]t best, fiduciary
obligations involve highly flexible standards that would produce
relatively uncertain—even perhaps chaotic or ‘idiosyncratic’—
treatment.”104 Thus, he concludes that fiduciary obligations could
extend into the realm of mediation “only with a degree of judicial
adaptation,” which he claims is “unlikely to be forthcoming.”105 In
addition to his concern over the “chaotic” nature of fiduciary law,
Moffitt echoes concerns of other critics in identifying obstacles to
applying fiduciary law to mediators, such as the lack of a fixed
standard by which to judge mediator obligations, the lack of a
position of superiority sufficient to warrant fiduciary status, and the
structural difficulty of asserting simultaneous fiduciary duties to
parties with opposing interests. Moffitt warns that “[f]iduciary
obligations cannot be structured responsibly in a way that would
damn the mediator no matter what she did, yet holding a fiduciary
obligation simultaneously to opposing parties risks exactly that.”106
Similarly, other critics have argued that the nature of the fiduciary
obligation fits uneasily with the mediator’s dual obligations to
adverse parties.
In spite of the skepticism of most scholars since Chaykin, a few
scholars and mediators have recently indicated that fiduciary duties
might be a strong possibility in the future of mediation. For
example, in 2000 David Bristow and Jesmond Parke warned of the
“gathering storm” of mediator liability and argued that rather than
immunity from liability, the nature of alternative dispute resolution
professions indicates that mediators “expose themselves to great risk
of liability.”107 Bristow and Parke argue that breach of fiduciary duty
is among the potential claims “just over the horizon” for

103.
104.
105.
106.

Moffitt, supra note 24, at 167 (emphasis added).
Id. at 168 (quoting Chaykin, supra note 10, at 748).
Id.
Id.; see also LAURENCE BOULLE & MIRYANA NESIC, MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES
PROCESS PRACTICE 519 (2001).
107. Bristow & Parke, supra note 73, at 19.
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mediators.108 They conclude that “[i]n the context of mediation, the
concept of fiduciary duties is ideal for the assessment of liability”
because the mediator acts for the benefit of the clients, and a
relationship implying and necessitating great trust, reliance, and
confidence exists.109 In particular, they explain that
[m]ediators are often called upon not only for their expertise in a
particular field but also for their ability to mediate or guide a
process of negotiation. Expectations are high in their performance
of these duties. They are required to be neutral, objective, wellversed in the field they mediate or arbitrate, and to be sensitive to
confidential information.110

In 2004, Alvin Zimmerman similarly stated to a symposium on
mediator accountability, “I suggest to you that each of us serves in a
fiduciary capacity. . . . I think the moment we step into a mediation
role—the moment we enter the room as a neutral and it is found
that we are not neutral—we have misrepresented ourselves.”111 He
claims it is too “myopic” to think that one must have a single client
to be a fiduciary.112 He argues that “[w]hether misrepresentation
comes in the form of negligence or in the form of actual
misrepresentation or fraud, it constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty,”
and he warns that for an “inventive plaintiff lawyer, any of those
concepts can be seized upon for liability.”113 With the theoretical
basis of fiduciary liability for mediators accepted by some and the
practical application of the theory increasingly being promoted by
others in recent years, it is important for mediators as well as plaintiff
attorneys to be aware of the concerns and the strengths relating to
the argument that mediators are at least potential fiduciaries.
Almost assuredly, mediation will never reach the formal degree
of fiduciary duty that attorneys, trustees, and corporate officers
possess—and that Chaykin argued for in his 1984 article114—because
of the lower degrees of power, control, discretion, and dominance
entrusted to mediators. But certain qualities inherent, or at least

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 19.
Zimmerman et al., supra note 73, at 62.
Id.
Id.
Chaykin, supra note 10, at 745.
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common, in mediation relationships serve to establish the potential,
and even likelihood, that future courts might extend informal
fiduciary duties to mediators under certain factual circumstances.
Trust is arguably an essential element of mediation, for there
exists a relationship implying and necessitating a great deal of
reliance, confidence, and trust in the mediator on the part of the
client in order to make the process run effectively. One scholar
noted, “[t]he development of trust is a crucial aspect of both the
dispute resolution and education functions of mediation.”115 Such a
high degree of trust and reliance helps to establish a relationship of
confidence and thus facilitates the creation of an informal fiduciary
relationship. The confidentiality requirements of a mediation
relationship also increase the probability that a fiduciary relationship
will exist, especially in a jurisdiction that allows mediators an
evidentiary privilege to protect mediation confidentiality. The
increasing professionalism of mediation also lends itself well to a
fiduciary analysis, and if a mediator is licensed or credentialed, it will
likely increase the chances of being a fiduciary.116 Additionally, as
more standardized regulations for mediation are adopted, it will
become easier to establish a standard by which to judge liability for
violation of any duties owed by mediators.117
Other fact-specific qualities in each mediation relationship may
also contribute to the finding of fiduciary liability. For example, if a
mediator is a professional, full-time problem solver hired by the
disputant for a substantial fee, a higher level of legal accountability
may be appropriate due to the heightened formality of the
relationship, the mediator’s level of expertise, the degree of
compensation, and the reliance of the client upon the skills and
experience of the mediator.118 This would especially be true if the

115. Peter A. Veglahn, Education by Third Party Neutrals: Functions, Methods, and
Extent, 28 LAB. L.J. 20, 24 (1977).
116. See Alexander v. Culp, 705 N.E.2d 378, 382 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (stating that any
professional—not exclusively licensed professionals―can be sued for professional negligence);
Moffitt, supra note 24, at 154 n.23 (“Regardless of whether mediation is considered a
profession, a mediator will likely be held to owe a heightened duty of care toward her clients.
The fact that a mediator may not be considered a ‘professional’ will not generally protect her
from liability for professional negligence.”).
117. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
118. See Scharffs & Welch, supra note 9, at 169–74, 178–79 (discussing the
characteristics of a fiduciary and a fiduciary relationship that tend to heighten the magnitude of
the fiduciary’s duty to the beneficiary).
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breach was more than just negligence and in fact constituted a clear
and intentional failure to fully disclose conflicts of interest, a breach
of the confidentiality agreement, or a material misrepresentation
regarding the mediator’s qualifications or impartiality.119 On the
other hand, if the mediator is a neighborhood volunteer,
uncompensated or minimally compensated, whose only claims to
expertise are short training sessions, it is less likely that a court would
apply the law of fiduciary duty, which would impose risks that would
significantly deter volunteer entry into the mediation field or induce
mediators to only accept paying clients. The degree of vulnerability
and reliance, rather than the sophistication of the mediating clients,
would also be a likely factor in establishing a fiduciary relationship, as
would the existence of specificity in the promises involved in the
contractual agreement.120
All or some of these factors, as well as other relevant factors,
would work to increase the clients’ expectations for the quality of
work and duty from the mediator and would thus lead toward the
finding of a fiduciary relationship. These factual characteristics of the
circumstances surrounding mediation relationships and transactions
are key examples of the factors included in the analytical framework
described below. While the traditional approach to fiduciary law, as
described below, results in little direction for when to apply fiduciary
liability to informal relationships of trust, these factors, when
analyzed under the framework below, help provide greater
predictability.
V. FINDING PREDICTABILITY IN FIDUCIARY LAW:
THE SCHARFFS-WELCH FRAMEWORK
In the face of the future likelihood of increasing lawsuits against
mediators based on their quasi-fiduciary duties and the probable
qualification of certain mediations as informal fiduciary relationships
in the future, courts and mediators need to find a more predictable
method than the complex and unwieldy traditional doctrinal
approach to fiduciary law. Traditionally, courts have approached
119. See id. at 209 (discussing a hierarchy of alleged breaches of fiduciary duty and noting
that “a court is more likely to find liability for fiduciary conduct that can fairly be characterized
as malfeasance as opposed to nonfeasance”).
120. See id. at 176–77, 185 (demonstrating that vulnerability and reliance of a beneficiary
upon a fiduciary tend to increase the magnitude of duty owed by the fiduciary to the
beneficiary).
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fiduciary liability questions by applying established statutes or
common law precedents to determine (1) whether a formal or
informal fiduciary relationship exists between the two parties and (2)
what duties the fiduciary owes to the beneficiaries and whether the
fiduciary breached at least one of those duties.121 Because this
traditional approach takes into account thousands of court rulings
and statutes, the law of fiduciaries is not only a complex area of law
but is also unpredictable and even inconsistent in determinations
about when fiduciary relationships exist and which duties are owed in
the context of that relationship. As one court has acknowledged,
“[c]ourts have historically declined to offer a rigid definition of a
fiduciary relationship in order to allow imposition of fiduciary duties
where justified. Thus, the relationship can arise in a variety of
circumstances, and may stem from varied and unpredictable
factors.”122 This leads to various courts coming to different and
conflicting conclusions about whether similar types of relationships
constitute fiduciary relationships and whether similar types of
behavior constitute breaches of duties. Focusing solely on the
traditional case by case questions of whether a fiduciary relationship
exists and whether any duty has been breached provides no
predictability for a mediator or other potential informal fiduciary to
determine when a court is likely to apply fiduciary duties or to attach
fiduciary liability for alleged breaches of duties.
While the multitude of relevant fiduciary cases and statutes
provide no comprehensive or systematic approach to this complex
area of the law, Professors Brett G. Scharffs and John W. Welch
recently developed a fact-intensive analytical framework that provides
an organizing principle to the different ways courts have dealt with
fiduciary law.123 Professors Scharffs and Welch developed this
framework (the “Scharffs-Welch framework”) in response to the
inadequacy of traditional approaches to fiduciary law, observing,
“The formulaic application of doctrinal categories often does as
much to obfuscate as it does to illuminate the likely outcome of a
particular case.”124 Particularly, they claim that “[f]ocusing
exclusively upon whether a fiduciary relationship exists, and whether
121. See id. at 164–65 (describing the traditional “doctrinal approach” to fiduciary law).
122. HAJMM Co. v. House of Raeford Farms, Inc., 403 S.E.2d 483, 489 (N.C. 1991)
(citations omitted).
123. See Scharffs & Welch, supra note 9.
124. Id. at 165.
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a particular duty has been breached is often not particularly helpful
in trying to determine whether a court is likely to find that there has
been an actionable breach of fiduciary duty.”125 In light of the
unpredictability and inconsistencies inherent in this traditional
approach, the Scharffs-Welch framework is designed to provide
guidance for practitioners as well as courts through the maze of
fiduciary law.
In developing this new guide to approaching fiduciary law,
Professors Scharffs and Welch analyzed a myriad of cases involving
alleged breaches of fiduciary duty in a broad array of relationships.
Their research collectively revealed as many as thirty factors routinely
considered by courts when determining whether to apply fiduciary
duties to a relationship and whether to hold a fiduciary liable for
breach of those duties.126 Scharffs and Welch then analyzed the
applicable factors tending to either heighten or lower the likelihood
of a court holding a fiduciary liable for breach of duty. This analysis
revealed several underlying principles that effectively illuminate and
organize the often conflicting and seemingly irreconcilable decisions
in fiduciary duty case law.127 By basing their analytical framework on
these organizing principles, Scharffs and Welch provide a new
approach to fiduciary law that reveals a greater degree of
predictability and consistency in fiduciary law than traditional
approaches have revealed.
The Scharffs-Welch framework compiles the key factors that
courts have regularly considered in approaching fiduciary law and
breaks these characteristics down into three related inquiries to assess
the magnitude of both duties and breaches on a sliding scale.128 First,
the framework goes beyond the question of whether a fiduciary
relationship exists and instead focuses on the magnitude of duty
arising within a particular relationship of trust. This determination of
how high of a duty is owed by a fiduciary is based on several factual
characteristics, including the fiduciary’s position, expertise,
dominance, amount of control and discretion entrusted, amount of
compensation, and whether the fiduciary serves in a full-time or parttime capacity; the beneficiary’s vulnerability or sophistication; the

125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 166.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 166–67.
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formality, expectations, specificity of promises, voluntariness, relative
power, reliance, divergence of interests, and negotiation involved in
the relationship; and the significance of the subject matter
involved.129 Second, the framework evaluates the magnitude of the
alleged breach of that duty, based on factors such as the following:
the magnitude, frequency, and duration of the harm; the character of
the fiduciary’s deliberative process; the character of the fiduciary’s
motives, presence of greed, or conflicts of interest; and the
classification, such as disclosure or fraud, of the alleged breach.130
Third, the framework looks to the context of the breach to
determine the appropriate degree of damages required.131
By evaluating both the magnitude of the fiduciary duty in a
relationship of trust as well as the magnitude of the breach of that
duty, the Scharffs-Welch framework provides an effective tool to
predict the likelihood for liability. It allows a practitioner, legal
counsel, or judge to analyze the situation under the factors and then
to determine whether the specific characteristics of the mediation
relationship in question are of a high enough magnitude in the duty
and the breach to warrant liability. In their article introducing their
new approach to fiduciary law, Professors Scharffs and Welch apply
the framework to educators and demonstrate that the framework
provides an effective model to accurately predict when courts will
apply fiduciary duties to educators.132 They explain that the
framework “is useful in evaluating a broad array of fiduciary
relationships and is particularly helpful in the complex and
multifaceted area of evaluating alleged breaches of duty by teachers
and educators.”133 Specifically, Scharffs and Welch demonstrate that
under the traditional approach, an “overly simplistic application of
doctrines such as ‘duty of care’ and ‘duty of loyalty’ may result in
outcomes that are difficult to explain or reconcile with other
decisions.”134 With consideration of magnitude of both duty and
breach under the Scharffs-Welch framework, however, “an
underlying consistency and coherence in the decisions begins to

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
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come into focus, albeit of an imperfect and sometimes contestable
nature.”135
This consistency and predictability results from the underlying
trends revealed by the analysis of Professors Scharffs and Welch.136
Their research revealed that when a fiduciary owes a high magnitude
of duty and then also breaches that duty in a way that constitutes a
high magnitude under the Scharffs-Welch framework, courts have
been most likely to attach fiduciary liability and apply an available
and appropriate remedy. But if the duty owed is of a low magnitude
and the breach of that duty is also of a low degree of seriousness,
courts are least likely to attach fiduciary liability to a particular person
in a relationship of trust. For all other cases that fall somewhere in
the middle of the two sliding scales of magnitude of duty and
breach, the likelihood that a court will attach fiduciary liability
increases as the magnitude of either the duty or breach increases.
Thus, since formal fiduciaries such as attorneys, corporate officers,
and trustees are held to a high magnitude of duty, they are often
found liable for breaches of those duties even when the breaches are
of a relatively low degree of seriousness. Conversely, fiduciaries with
a relatively lower degree of fiduciary duty, such a teachers, parents,
coaches, or travel agents, are rarely held liable under fiduciary law
unless their misconduct qualifies as an egregious breach.
When applied to mediation relationships, the Scharffs-Welch
framework provides much-needed predictability for mediators to
determine which, if any, fiduciary duties apply to them and whether
they will likely be found liable for certain alleged breaches of those
duties. Yet the framework also maintains the necessary flexibility to
not stifle or overly regulate the varied mediation profession.137 While
all mediation relationships will probably not rise to a relationship of
fiduciary duty, the factors laid out in the Scharffs-Welch framework
provide a guide for determining the likelihood, in particular factual
circumstances, that a court might find a mediator liable for fiduciary
obligations in the future. By considering both the magnitude of the
duty and the magnitude of the breach, the framework provides a way
to determine whether a particular breach in a mediation relationship
135. Id.
136. See id. at 167–68.
137. See id. at 167 (claiming that the Scharffs-Welch framework “inherently recognizes
that fiduciary duties are not created equal, and all breaches will not be regarded as equally
harmful”).
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warrants liability. Although courts have not yet subjected any
mediators to fiduciary liability and have continued to apply only the
traditional doctrinal approach to analyzing fiduciary relationships,
this framework helps predict the potential for future litigation against
mediators as more claims are brought and as views about mediation
become more formalized. When applied to the existing handful of
cases against mediators brought under claims of misconduct, as
discussed below, the framework illuminates the reasoning behind the
rulings and clearly places the seemingly disconnected and even
arbitrary decisions into a pattern that will allow for future findings of
fiduciary liability against mediators.
The only case recorded in the federal reporters involving a claim
of fiduciary duty against a mediator provides a noteworthy example
of the potential for a court to eventually attach fiduciary liability to
certain mediators if the circumstances amount to a high enough
magnitude of breach. In Lehrer v. Zwernemann, the plaintiff sought
to hold his two attorneys, opposing counsel, and the mediator liable
for “negligence or legal malpractice, breach of contract, breach of
fiduciary duty, Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act violations, fraud,
and conspiracy to commit fraud” based on several alleged grounds,
including the failure of the mediator to disclose prior relationships
with the opposing attorney.138 The trial court sustained a no
evidence motion for summary judgment for the mediator, and the
appellate court affirmed, finding that the plaintiff had failed to
produce evidence that he had suffered legal injury as a result of the
mediator’s actions at the mediation.139 The plaintiff argued that
while the mediator represented himself as a third party neutral, he in
fact had a conflict of interest which he did not disclose to the
plaintiff.140 Rather than focus on particular duties or standards
required of a mediator, the court took a functional approach. The
court concluded that the “primary obligation” of a mediator is “to
facilitate a settlement,” which the defendant accomplished.141
Summary judgment in favor of the mediator was ultimately affirmed
because the plaintiff could not demonstrate evidence of any injury
caused by the mediator’s misconduct and the plaintiff had at least

138.
139.
140.
141.
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constructive knowledge of the prior professional relationship with
the opposing attorney.142 Since the court did not specifically address
the validity of applying fiduciary duties to a mediator, this opinion
leaves the possibility open. The opinion also implies that such a claim
for breach of fiduciary duty might be successful if the plaintiff could
present additional evidence of a more substantial legal injury. In the
terms of the Scharffs-Welch framework, Lehrer represents a low
magnitude of fiduciary duty (since mediators owe lower duties than
formal fiduciaries) coupled with a low magnitude of breach (since
the breach resulted in no discernable legal injury); thus, fiduciary
duties would not attach under the Scharffs-Welch framework.
Courts have also addressed a handful of other cases brought
against mediators for misconduct in which fiduciary duty claims were
not raised but in which the court rulings, when analyzed under the
Scharffs-Welch framework, include rationales relevant to the future
application of fiduciary duties to mediators. While these cases have
little precedential value since they come from lower courts and only
tangentially consider issues of fiduciary duties, they are nevertheless
instructive of how courts might consider future claims based on
fiduciary law.
In 2003, a California court found that mediators do owe certain
duties of care and loyalty to parties of the mediation and that
mediators are in a position of potentially significant influence over
parties to a mediation. In Furia v. Helm, the court held that
although the defendant was an attorney, he was acting in the
capacity of a mediator and had fully disclosed his role as a mediator
and not an attorney in the proceedings.143 Thus, the court held that
no attorney-client relationship arose, so the attorney-mediator did
not owe fiduciary obligations to the plaintiff.144 The court went on,
however, to emphasize that in spite of the lack of an attorney-client
relationship, “an attorney agreeing to act as a neutral mediator for
the conflicting parties” did in fact assume duties to both parties
involved in the mediation.145
While the Furia court chose not to “explore the full dimensions
of that duty,” it found that such a duty owed by a mediator

142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 778.
Furia v. Helm, 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 357, 363–64 (Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 364.
Id.
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“certainly” included the duty of full disclosure to the parties about
the mediator’s potential conflicts of interest or lack of impartiality.146
Specifically, the court stated, “we have no doubt that an attorney
accepting the role of mediator has the same duty of full disclosure as
an attorney accepting the representation of clients with actual or
potentially conflicting interests.”147 The court also stated that an
attorney-mediator assumes the duty of performing as a mediator
with the skill and prudence ordinarily to be expected of one
performing that role.148 Thus, when considering this case under the
Scharffs-Welch framework, the factual analysis indicates that the
defendant’s expertise and title of attorney heightened the magnitude
of his duty, although his status as a mediator kept that duty lower
than it would have been if he had been acting in the capacity of an
attorney rather than a mediator.149
Finally, the Furia court made the crucial finding that while
“[m]ediators may not provide legal advice . . . they are in a position
to influence the positions taken by the conflicting parties whose
dispute they are mediating.”150 This suggests that the element of
influence, which is necessary in order to find a fiduciary relationship,
exists in a mediation relationship in spite of the court’s assertion that
fiduciary duties only apply to attorneys. The court further
demonstrated the special influence of a mediator, and thus the
vulnerability of the clients, by stating, “A party to mediation may
well give more weight to the suggestions of the mediator if under
the belief that the mediator is neutral than if that party regards the
mediator as aligned with the interests of the adversary.”151 For these
reasons, the court concluded that “before an attorney agrees to serve
for compensation as a mediator, there must be ‘complete disclosure
of all facts and circumstances which, in the attorney’s honest
judgment, may influence the party’s choice, holding the attorney
civilly liable for loss caused by lack of disclosure.’”152 Thus, the court
146. Id.
147. Id. at 365.
148. Id.
149. See Scharffs & Welch, supra note 9, at 179.
150. Furia, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 365 (“‘The mediator’s role is simply to facilitate the parties’
direct negotiations,’ but ‘this is not a hard and fast rule. Many mediators do in fact offer their
opinions.’” (quoting KNIGHT ET AL., CAL. PRACTICE GUIDE: ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION ¶¶ 3:120, 3:121(1992))).
151. Id.
152. Id. (quoting Ishmael v. Millington, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592, 596 (Ct. App. 1966)).
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in Furia explicitly stated that a mediator-attorney might be found
civilly liable in his role as a mediator for breaching the duty of fulldisclosure of conflicts and for misrepresenting his lack of impartiality.
The court’s reasoning and the outcome of Furia are thus consistent
with the Scharffs-Welch framework in that the vulnerability of the
clients as well as the influence and expertise of the mediator
heightens the magnitude of duty that mediators owe.
Additionally, a district court in New York has attempted to
establish a general standard of care for mediators, indicating that if
the facts had involved a higher magnitude of breach, the court would
have attached liability. In the 2002 case Chang’s Imports v. Srader, a
trademark licensor brought a negligence action against an attorney
who mediated a settlement agreement between the licensor and its
licensee.153 On the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the
court dismissed the negligence claim and held that the defendant was
not acting as an attorney for either party but rather was acting as a
neutral mediator and thus was not negligent.154 Although the court
found that as a mediator the defendant lacked the higher duty
necessary to establish a negligence claim,155 a deeper analysis of this
case indicates that given different factual circumstances, the attorneymediator might have been found liable under the court’s reasoning.
The negligence alleged in the claim was based largely on the
accusation that the attorney-mediator was providing legal
representation to two clients with adverse interests.156 Thus, the
negligence claim was fundamentally based on the status of the
mediator as an attorney, since such dual representation is prohibited
when providing legal representation but is inherent when providing
mediation. The court stated that “a mediator cannot be held to a
higher degree of skill and care than that commonly exercised by
ordinary members of the relevant mediation community.”157
Therefore, if the alleged negligence had instead been based on a
violation connected with his role of mediator, and if his skill and care
were significantly below the typical standard for mediators, then the

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Chang’s Imports, Inc. v. Srader, 216 F. Supp. 2d 325, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
Id. at 334.
Id. at 330.
See id.
Id. at 332–33.
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attorney-mediator might have been held liable.158 Additionally, the
court emphasized the fact that the defendant adequately and
accurately defined his role and fully disclosed his conflicting interests
in the waiver signed by both parties before the mediation began.159
Like Furia, the ruling in Chang’s Imports is also consistent with
factors indicating a lower magnitude of breach under the ScharffsWelch framework. The framework helps explain the outcome of this
case. As a mediator the defendant had a lower level of duty, which
was heightened to a certain degree by his status and sophistication as
an attorney, but which was lessened by his disclosure to both parties
that he represented both their interests. Thus, the parties could not
reasonably rely on him to solely promote their individual interests
and so no fiduciary duty was found. Also, since the court found that
he did not fail to disclose his conflicts, nor did he misrepresent his
impartiality, any negligence which he may have committed would
not be a serious enough magnitude of breach to warrant holding
him liable for a breach of a minimal duty. Although the court does
not specifically mention fiduciary liability in this case, it leaves open
the possibility that under different circumstances, such as a failure to
fully disclose a conflict of interest or a material misrepresentation of
qualifications or ability to be impartial, the court might have found
differently and held him to a higher magnitude of duty and breach.
The reasoning behind the rulings in Lehrer, Furia, and Chang’s
Imports, when considered in the context of the Scharffs-Welch
framework, indicates that mediators may be held civilly liable in the
future if they violate important duties owed to clients, such as
impartiality and full disclosure of conflicts of interest. This liability
would likely extend to fiduciary duties for mediators in cases where
the clients can show a special reliance by the clients on the
158. Currently, a finding for mediator negligence liability would be problematic because,
as the court in Chang’s Imports noted, “[t]here is almost no law on what the appropriate
standard of care is, if any, for a mediator who helps negotiate a settlement between parties.”
Id. at 332. However, as the UMA and other legislation and regulations are passed which
provide comprehensive standards for mediators, this requirement will be more easily met and
mediators’ exposure to negligence liability, or malpractice, will likely increase. See Hedges,
supra note 31, at 1563 (“The UMA permits disclosure of a mediation communication, as an
exception to the mediation privilege, if the communication is sought or offered to prove or
disprove a claim or complaint ‘of professional misconduct or malpractice’ against a mediator. . .
. If New Jersey passes the UMA with that language, it might be possible to argue that the
legislature has indirectly created a new cause of action of professional misconduct or
professional malpractice for mediators, where one did not exists before.”).
159. Chang’s Imports, 216 F. Supp. 2d at 331.
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mediator’s impartiality and neutral status as well as the influence of
the mediator over the parties, as described in Furia v. Helm.
VI. APPLYING THE SCHARFFS-WELCH FRAMEWORK TO ADDRESS
CONCERNS OF CRITICS
As shown in the sections above, not only is it likely that fiduciary
duty claims will be increasingly filed against mediators, it is also likely
that future courts will apply fiduciary liability to mediators for serious
misconduct. When courts apply fiduciary law to these future claims
with a more consistent and predictable approach, such as the
Scharffs-Welch framework described above, the law of fiduciary
duties will be able to provide an effective and appropriate tool to
define and regulate the obligations of mediators to their clients.
While there are several concerns voiced by critics regarding the
extension, or potential extension, of fiduciary liability to mediators,
this section will focus on three major arguments which have been
raised regarding (1) the unwieldiness of fiduciary law, (2) the lack of
superiority of mediators resulting from their inability to pass
judgment, and (3) the dual obligations to parties with conflicting
interests. While these fears have been obstacles to extending fiduciary
liability to mediators for the past two decades, the strength of these
concerns dissolves upon closer analysis.
A. Fiduciary Law: Unwieldy or Flexible?
First, several critics warn that fiduciary law is too chaotic,
unpredictable, and varied to provide a comprehensive standard with
which to judge the fiduciary status and liability of mediators.160
Michael Moffitt, for example, argues that because of this uncertain
and even chaotic system of standards used by courts to determine the
existence of fiduciary relationships, “[f]iduciary obligations
constitute a sloppy mechanism for creating mediator obligations—
one that is very unlikely to be available to prospective litigants.”161
Another article critical of the fiduciary model endorses a more
flexible model for analyzing fiduciary relationships in order to take
into account the wide range of types of mediation and types of

160. See, e.g., Moffitt, supra note 24, at 168–69.
161. Id. at 169.
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fiduciaries.162 Specifically, it voices concern that fiduciary law cannot
encompass all types of mediators and thus is not appropriate as a
standard by which to judge mediator liability.163
The Scharffs-Welch framework provides just such a flexible
model and is particularly useful in determining the potential
existence of fiduciary duties in informal fiduciary relationships where
the determination is entirely fact-specific. Professors Scharffs and
Welch describe their framework as helpful because it “inherently
recognizes that all fiduciary duties are not created equal, and that all
breaches will not be regarded as equally harmful.”164 This framework
organizes the chaos of fiduciary law by providing a compilation of
the factors and categories of factors used most often by courts to
determine fiduciary status. This approach leads to flexible analysis
because it allows courts to choose the most relevant factors
applicable to the case at hand. The framework overcomes the
apparent unpredictability of fiduciary law by clarifying the implicit
balancing test between magnitude of duty and magnitude of breach
used by courts to determine whether fiduciary liability applies.
The Scharffs-Welch framework shows that not all mediation
relationships would be potentially held to the higher level of
fiduciary duty but rather that certain factors provide reasonable
grounds for certain types of mediation—those with high levels of
expertise, reliance, trust, and compensation, for example—to be held
to this higher standard. In this respect, although Chaykin’s premise
of holding mediators liable under fiduciary law was valid, the
criticisms were correct that his absolute, even per se, categorization
of mediators as fiduciaries was too expansive and ignored the wide
variations among mediators.165 But critics should not dismiss the
fiduciary approach simply because it does not apply to all mediators,
or rather because mediators cannot be categorized as formal
fiduciaries. Such variance is an integral part of the designation of
informal fiduciaries as opposed to formal fiduciaries, and it is this
flexibility, in fact, which makes a fiduciary analysis ideal for
determining the liability of members of a profession as varied as
mediation.166
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
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B. Lack of Superiority

Opponents of the theory of finding fiduciary duties in mediation
relationships argue that a plaintiff seeking to establish a mediator’s
fiduciary obligation would be challenged to demonstrate that the
mediator occupied a position of superiority and influence sufficient
to warrant fiduciary status.167 The court in Furia v. Helm held that
while “mediators may not provide legal advice . . . they are in a
position to influence the positions taken by the conflicting parties
whose dispute they are mediating.”168 Further, “[a] party to
mediation may well give more weight to the suggestions of the
mediator if under the belief that the mediator is neutral than if that
party regards the mediator as aligned with the interests of the
adversary.”169 Moffitt points out that, unlike an agent, attorney,
officer, or trustee, “a mediator is not empowered by the party to
make decisions on behalf of the party.”170
This is true when a mediator strictly limits his actions to
facilitating the negotiation; however, it has been observed that many
mediators now engage in evaluative mediation in which the mediator
steps beyond the traditional role of facilitator and engages in
determining the outcome of the mediation.171 Such evaluative
mediating would likely heighten the magnitude of duty of a
mediator because it would constitute greater influence and even
superiority in some circumstances. Moffitt even acknowledges that a
“mediator who engages in case evaluation increases her exposure to
liability because the process of evaluation almost certainly falls within
the parameters of the practice of law.”172

167. See Moffitt, supra note 24, at 168; 36A C.J.S. FIDUCIARY 383 (1961) (noting that
influence and superiority are necessary factors in declaring fiduciary status).
168. Furia v. Helm, 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 357, 365 (Ct. App. 2003).
169. Id.
170. See Moffitt, supra note 24, at 168–69.
171. Furia, 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 363–64 (“‘The mediator’s role is simply to facilitate the
parties’ direct negotiations,’ but ‘this is not a hard and fast rule. Many mediators do in fact
offer their opinions.’” (quoting KNIGHT ET AL., CAL. PRACTICE GUIDE: ALTERNATIVE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION ¶¶ 3:120, 3:121(1992))); AM. BAR ASS’N ET AL., supra note 32, at 7
(limiting a mediator’s ability to shift to a more evaluative or adjudicatory role without notice to
and consent of the parties). However, these standards have not yet been adopted by most
states and thus have no legally binding value.
172. Moffitt, supra note 24, at 170 n.83; see, e.g., Lela P. Love, The Top Ten Reasons Why
Mediators Should Not Evaluate, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 937, 938–39 (1997) (arguing that
evaluative mediators combine roles that are incompatible).
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Additionally, a highly qualified mediator can arguably have
enough experience to establish a fiduciary relationship by producing
an imbalance of position sufficient to constitute mediator superiority
and client reliance and vulnerability. Thus, under situations in which
the mediator takes the affirmative step to increase his level of
superiority and influence, the mediator draws closer to incurring
fiduciary liabilities. The Scharffs-Welch framework identifies the most
relevant factors for a court to consider in making this determination
of whether a mediator has reached a level of sufficient superiority,
influence, and control to impose fiduciary duties.173 This
identification of specific and quantifiable factors allows “lawyers,
judges, and litigants to identify and produce all the evidence
systematically relevant to a sound resolution of the case.”174
C. Dual Obligations
Critics have also maintained that mediators cannot be vested
with fiduciary duties because, unlike traditional fiduciaries such as
trustees and attorneys, mediators owe a duty to multiple parties with
conflicting interests.175 This has elicited skepticism about the validity
of applying fiduciary liability to mediators and statements that “[n]o
courts . . . have accepted the underlying proposition that mediators
somehow owe fiduciary duties simultaneously to two or more
mediation parties.”176 Yet, as one scholar has observed, “the legal
concept of fiduciary duty does not apply in the same way in
mediation as it does in the traditional litigation model. . . . Indeed,
fiduciary duty and confidentiality are relevant to mediation, but do
not take the same meaning as in litigation.”177 Just as there are
varying levels of fiduciary duties between those owed by business
173. Scharffs & Welch, supra note 9, at 171–73 (describing how factors increasing a
fiduciary’s expertise, control, and discretion tend to heighten the level of the fiduciary’s duty).
174. Id. at 168.
175. BOULLE & NESIC, supra note 106, at 519 (arguing that the nature of the fiduciary
obligation fits uneasily with the mediator’s dual obligations to adverse parties); Moffit, supra
note 24, at 168 (“[P]rospective plaintiff would need to overcome the structural difficulty of
asserting that the mediator owes simultaneous fiduciary obligations to parties with opposing
interests in the matter at hand. Fiduciary obligations cannot be structured responsibly in a way
that would damn the mediator no matter what she did, yet holding a fiduciary obligation
simultaneously to opposing parties risks exactly that.”).
176. See Moffitt, supra note 75, at 128.
177. Tad Kojima, Keeping Mediation an Alternative Dispute Resolution Process (2001),
http://www.cfcj-fcjc.org/full-text/2001_dra/tad_kojima.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2005).
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partners, attorneys, and trustees and those owed by informal
fiduciaries like teachers, clergy, and parents, so is there a distinction
in the height of duty of an attorney versus the type of duty of a
mediator.
The Scharffs-Welch framework acknowledges this spectrum of
duties among fiduciaries and provides a way to apply fiduciary law
appropriately to account for differing levels of duties and breaches.178
Among the factors listed regarding the characteristics and history of a
potential fiduciary relationship, the Scharffs-Welch framework
includes the element of exclusivity as an important characteristic to
consider when determining the magnitude of fiduciary duties.179
Professors Scharffs and Welch explain, “if a fiduciary represents
multiple beneficiaries, we would expect that this would sometimes
result in a somewhat lower magnitude of duty.”180 Although a lack of
exclusivity in the relationship might lower the magnitude of a
fiduciary’s duty to a beneficiary, under the Scharffs-Welch framework
it does not necessarily preclude the attachment of some fiduciary
duties. The framework demonstrates that a high magnitude of
breach can offset a relatively low magnitude of duty.181 Professors
Scharffs and Welch, in applying their analytical framework to
educators, demonstrate case law in which fiduciary duties have been
extended to professors for serious breaches of trust.182 In these
examples, the fact that the relevant educators simultaneously owed
potentially conflicting duties to other students did not shield the
professors from fiduciary liability for extreme breaches of certain
fiduciary duties.

178. Scharffs & Welch, supra note 9, at 167.
179. Id. at 182–83.
180. Id. (“For example, a manager for an artist or athlete who works exclusively for that
individual is likely to be held to a relatively higher magnitude of duty than an agent who
represents multiple artists or athletes.”).
181. Id. at 167–68.
182. Id. at 219–29; see Chou v. Univ. of Chi., 254 F.3d 1347, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(holding a supervising professor liable for breach of fiduciary duty for telling the inventorstudent that his ideas could not be patented and then filing a patent application listing the
professor as the sole inventor); Johnson v. Schmitz, 119 F. Supp. 2d 90, 97 (D. Conn. 2000)
(denying Yale University’s motion to dismiss a claim for breach of fiduciary duty against a
dissertation committee for discouraging a student’s use of his ideas and then misappropriating
the ideas for the professors’ own use); Schneider v. Plymouth State Coll., 744 A.2d 101, 104
(N.H. 1999) (“[I]n the context of sexual harassment by faculty members, the relationship
between a post-secondary institution and its students is a fiduciary one.”).
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Professor Nolan-Haley similarly described a mediator’s dual
obligations as consistent, arguing that “the mediator is said to
represent the integrity of the mediation process and it is in this sense
then that the mediator has a special fiduciary relationship with both
parties to a dispute.”183 Further, as Chaykin argued, “[i]n both
trustee and corporate situations, it is not uncommon for the parties
to whom fiduciary duties are owed to assert conflicting, adverse
interests.”184 He points to the examples of corporate actors who
must balance between the potentially conflicting interests of
shareholders, directors, officers, and employees, all to whom he owes
fiduciary duties.185 Likewise, Chaykin argues, “[t]he existence of
adverse interests among beneficiaries in no way alters the trustee’s
responsibility. His duty remains one of fairness and impartiality, and
he must act in the best interest of the entire trust.”186
Thus, certain duties do not necessarily change just because the
two parties to whom a fiduciary owes the duties have adverse
interests in the transaction. In order to preserve fairness, openness,
and impartiality in the mediation process, mediators should be
obligated to maintain confidentiality, to fully disclose conflicts of
interest, to act in good faith, and to make no false
misrepresentations. These duties constitute non-conflicting interests
of all parties involved and thus the mediator can fulfill his duty to
work for the benefit of both parties within this context.
VII. CONCLUSION
Although most scholars and courts have not yet recognized
fiduciary liability for mediators, recent trends indicate that at least
some legal mediation relationships will likely be future additions to
the expanding list of informal fiduciaries. While courts themselves
will likely continue to apply the traditional doctrinal approach to
fiduciary law when analyzing duties of mediators, the Scharffs-Welch
framework helps mediators to more accurately predict when and to
what extent such fiduciary duties will apply to particular factual

183. Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Informed Consent in Mediation: A Guiding Principle
for Truly Educated Decisionmaking, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 775, 826 (1999).
184. Chaykin, supra note 10, at 739 n.40.
185. Id. (citing Broad v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 614 F.2d 418, 430–32 (5th Cir. 1980)).
186. Id. (citing First Nat’l Bank of Birmingham v. Ingalls, 59 So. 2d 914, 921–23 (Ala.
1952)).
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circumstances of each mediation relationship. The framework is thus
a useful tool for clarifying the complex and varied standards used in
fiduciary law and for illuminating current case law that thus far has
avoided extending fiduciary liability to mediators, demonstrating that
the door is still open for courts to find some mediators to be
fiduciaries in the future.
Using this framework and analyzing the future of the mediation
profession in the context of recent trends also helps confront and
overcome several of the concerns which have been voiced by
opponents throughout the two decades of debate over extending
fiduciary duties to mediators. This analysis demonstrates that in the
future, mediators may likely owe some level of fiduciary obligations
to the parties in certain mediation proceedings—primarily fairness,
impartiality, confidentiality, disclosure of conflicts of interest, good
faith, and no false misrepresentation. This knowledge allows
mediators to prepare for the trends of the near future, when
mediation will likely take an established place among the professions,
with the accompanying benefits and liabilities of such a position.
Rebekah Ryan Clark
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